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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article serves as a guide to attorneys counselling potential
timeshare condominium purchasers.' Given the nature of a
1. The rapid growth of timesharing is attributable to several factors. The concept
dovetails with the mobility of our society. Timesharing holds the potential for multiplying
promoter profits because of the splintering of every single unit into fifty-two potential
sales.
A large cross-section of the population can afford to purchase one or two weeks of
vacation properties out of their savings, because the price range of such intervals approxi-
mates the price of a new automobile. The low cost obviates the necessity for permanent
mortgage financing, enabling the developer to ignore fluctuations in the availability of
mortgage money and varying interest rates. The dollar volume of timeshare offerings at-
tests to these conclusions.
Timesharing has become one of the fastest growing areas in real estate. A recent Wall
Street Journal article estimates that, in 1982 alone, sales of such interests were well over
the $1.5 billion mark, up from $1.3 billion in 1981, See Wall St. J., June 22, 1982, at 1, col.
1. As of 1982, there were over six hundred timeshare resorts in the United States, with a
quarter of a million families participating. See August, Clockwork Condo: The Tume-Sharzng
Condominium Stumbles Into Court, 11 REAL EST. L.J. 203 (1983); Bloch, Regulation of Ttneshar-
ing, 60 U. DET. J. URB. L. 23 (1982); Eastman, Time Share Ownership: A rimer, 57 N.D.L.
REV. 151 (1981); Ellsworth, CondomniumsAreSecurities?, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 694 (1974); Ells-
worth & Prendergast, Securities Maze Awaits Resort Time-Share Offerings, 10 REAL EST. REV.,
Spring 1980, at 59; Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Tume-Shanng, 57 OR. L. REV. 31 (1977);
Hart & Pfrommer, Financing the Time-Share Project, 12 REAL EST. REV., Fall 1982, at 72;
Pollack, Tme-Shanhg, or Time Is Money But Will It Selt?. 10 REAL EST. L.J. 281 (1982);
Smith, Urban Time-Sharing: A Major Growth Area, 12 REAL EST. REV., Summer 1982, at 69;
Comment, Time-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L. REv. 181 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Fourth Dimension]; Comment, Legal Challenges To Tine Shar-
ing Ownership, 45 Mo. L. REV. 423 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Legal Chal-
lenges/. See generally M. HENZE, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF TIME-SHARE RESORTS
(1982); R. POWELL, 4B POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 633.34[6] (1981); 1 P. ROHAN &
M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 17C.01-.02[F] (1983) [hereinafter
cited as ROHAN & RESKIN]; THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING (P.L.I.
Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982); Byrne, Securities Regulation of Time-Sharing
Resort Condominiums, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1978); Davis, Tme-Sharng Exchange Networks, 8
REAL EST. REV., Fall 1978, at 42.
The New York State Attorney General's Office has disclosed that since 1980, the
office has accepted seventeen Offering Plans for the sale of timesharing interests for filing.
The aggregate sales price reflected on the cover of such plans was approximately eight
hundred million dollars. There are currently ten timeshare Offering Plans being reviewed
[Vol. 10
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TIMESHA RING
timeshare offering, the attorney's role in this area may be minimal.
Purchaser's counsel should note that the developer's offer may not
be subject to any meaningful modification: the timeshare condo-
minium documentation may have already been processed through
one or more governmental agencies; some units may have already
been marketed under the original arrangement; or the transaction
may be too complex to tinker with. As a result, timesharing trans-
actions are typically offered to the public on a "take it or leave it"
basis.
Nevertheless, the attorney plays a significant role because lay
purchasers may have little understanding of the economic and le-
gal ramifications of a particular timeshare offering. Given that the
project may be situated in a remote vacation area, and that the
purchaser's investment may be too small to warrant hiring local
counsel if problems arise at a later date, clients must enter into a
timeshare investment with their eyes wide open.
This Article examines the history of timesharing, along with the
statutes, regulatory measures, and model acts that have evolved in
the past two decades. Developers' concerns, which may influence
the nature of the offering to the purchaser, are also noted where
applicable. The Article concludes with an analysis of the common
pitfalls found in timesharing arrangements.
II. "TIMESHARING"-"INTERVAL OWNERSHIP"-"VACATION
LICENSES"-WHAT'S IN A NAME?
Investment in a timeshare condominium is typically offered to
buyers under such labels as "timesharing," "interval ownership,"
or "vacation licenses." The public has a grasp of the central idea
of timeshare ownership and considers such labels tantamount to
brand names for a single commodity. Nevertheless, timeshare
projects may take one of a dozen or more legal formats. Each legal
form affects the project's structure, as well as the rights and obliga-
tions of the individual participants. Accordingly, purchasers'
counsel must begin their analysis with a review of the project
structure. In many instances, the offering will involve a complex
form of tenancy in common in real property, with or without a
condominium arrangement as an overlay. In other instances, the
offering will not involve a fee simple interest and the participants
for filing. The value of such offerings is approximately two hundred twenty-five million
dollars. Most of the offerings involve the sale of fee interests while three offerings involve
interests in cooperative corporations and four involve the "right-to-use" type ventures.
19841
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may purchase a lease, license, or contractual rights and
obligations.
A. Real Property Interests
Timesharing arrangements may involve the conveyance of a
"timeshare estate."'2 The ownership interest is evidenced by a
deed and may be covered by title insurance. At least two types of
"fee" timesharing arrangements are currently marketed: time
span ownership and interval ownership.
Time span ownership is an adaptation of the traditional tenancy
in common ownership. Individual use periods, typically one week
units, are established in covenants, conditions, or agreements,
which are separate from the deed evidencing the ownership inter-
est. The buyer receives an undivided interest in the particular
unit. A separate agreement establishes the time period when the
buyer may use the property. The owner irrevocably waives his
right to partition. Thus, a participant cannot sever his joint own-
ership of the property. 3
The second type of "fee" timeshare ownership is interval owner-
ship. Under this type of ownership, a separate agreement estab-
lishing the use period of each owner is unnecessary. A revolving
estate for years is conveyed to each owner. The purchaser actually
owns the unit for a specified period of time each year for a desig-
nated number of years. At the end of the period of years, which
approximates the useful life of the property, the estate for years
reverts to a tenancy in common. When all of the owners become
tenants in common, their percentage interests are proportionate to
the number of weeks they owned the units. 4 At the end of the
2. The Model Real Estate Time-Share Act (MRETSA), originally approved as a
uniform act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of 1979
and officially changed to a model act in August 1980, defines a "time-share estate" as
follows:
[a] right to occupy a unit or any of several units during [51 or more separated
time periods over a period of at least [51 years, including renewal options, cou-
pled with a freehold estate or an estate for years in a time-share property or a
specified portion thereof.
MODEL REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE AcT § 1-102(14), 7A U.L.A. 262 (Supp. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as MRETSA].
3. 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, at § 17C.0 IA. Irrevocable waiver of the right
to partition is a departure from the traditional concept of tenancy in common. In tenancy
in common, a sale of property or physical partition may be brought about by judicial
proceedings where the co-tenants have a falling out. Id
4. Id
[Vol. 10
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interval ownership term, partition is allowed, thereby enabling the
owners to dispose of the real property.
B Non-Real Property Interests
Non-real property forms of timesharing usually involve some
type of right-to-use interest.5 These forms of timesharing are often
marketed to the public as "vacation license," "vacation lease," or
"club membership" timeshares. Contractual relationships, rather
than a conveyance of an interest in real property are involved.
The documentation, as well as the participants' rights and obliga-
tions, will vary significantly from project to project.
The most popular type of non-ownership timeshare is the vaca-
tion license. This form of timesharing is widely used for vacation
resort properties. The license grants the buyer the right to use a
particular unit for a specified number of weeks. This right contin-
ues for a designated number of years. The vacation lease resem-
bles the vacation license, but allows the buyer to sublet or transfer
his rights thereunder. The lease may also designate a particular
unit that will be available to the participant. The club member-
ship timeshare involves the purchase of a membership which en-
ables the buyer to stay at the project for a specified period of time
each year. The club, in turn, owns or leases a building or resort
property for the benefit of its members.
The various types of right-to-use timesharing were developed to
escape federal and state regulations governing the marketing of
securities or interests in real property. In many jurisdictions, how-
ever, legislation or regulation has closed this loophole. For exam-
ple, some localities have imposed stringent regulations on right-to-
use arrangements, compared with minimal regulation on owner-
ship arrangements. This regulatory disparity can be attributed to
the ephemeral character of the right-to-use concept. Already, con-
fusion has arisen over whether the right-to-use form creates an in-
terest in real property.
C. Cooperative Interest
A "timeshare cooperative" is a cross between real property and
non-real property timesharing forms. The timeshare cooperative
5. MRETSA defines a "time-share license" as "a right to occupy a unit or any of
several units during [51 or more separated time periods over a period of at least [5] years,
including renewal options, not coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years."
MRETSA § 1-102(18) (Supp. 1983).
19841
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concept involves a cooperative corporation which owns or leases
the real estate. The timeshare owner buys shares of stock in the
corporation; the number of shares varies according to the size of
the unit, the length of the annual use period, or some other yard-
stick. Individual use periods are set forth in the proprietary lease.
6
There are many advantages to the timeshare cooperative. Ab-
sent other legal complications, developers will not have to register
a timeshare cooperative with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, because federal securities laws do not apply to cooperative
stock. 7 Thus, the developer avoids the considerable expense in-
volved in registering stock and complying with securities laws.
The developer may also receive capital gains treatment on the con-
veyance of title to the cooperative housing corporation. Unlike a
condominium developer, who is a "dealer" because of the multi-
plicity of sales, a developer who structures his timeshare as a coop-
erative makes only one sale. The property is transferred to the
cooperative corporation in exchange for all the monies paid into
the corporation by subscribers. Assuming the requisite holding pe-
riod, capital gains treatment should result.
Another advantage of a timeshare cooperative lies in the devel-
oper's ability to convey the property subject to a favorable existing
mortgage, assuming the existing mortgage does not contain a due
on sale clause. Timeshare units must be delivered to purchasers
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. Finally, a coopera-
tive corporation may refinance its mortgage debt with greater ease
than a condominium project, which requires a unanimous vote of
all the condominum unit owners. The cooperative's board of di-
rectors may refinance the building's debt without obtaining the
approval of all the shareholders.
D. Ownership J AT sip
., v. o-Ownersh." A Comparson
There are obvious advantages and disadvantages attendant to
both real property and non-real property forms of timesharing.
With timeshare ownership the buyer obtains a fee interest in the
6. The following is a sample provision in an Interval Proprietary Lease dealing with
the allocation of shares and assignment of use periods:
WHEREAS THE INTERVAL LESSEE is the owner of __ shares of stock of
the INTERVAL LESSOR (the cooperative corporation), to which this Interval Lease
is appurtenant and which have been allocated to Week #_ in Unit __ .
See 1 RONAN & RESKIN,supra note 1, at § 17C.01A n.3.
7. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Grenader
v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 10
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property and can deduct his interest and real estate tax payments.
A build-up of equity occurs and the value of the property may
increase. The buyer may also sell or lease his interest, if the pro-
ject's documentation permits. Disadvantages of timeshare owner-
ship include the usual burdens of fee ownership, such as the
obligations to maintain and repair the property. The owner must
also pay real property taxes.
The advantages of a non-ownership timeshare arrangement in-
clude the real or imagined escape from the burdens accompanying
fee ownership. Several disadvantages exist, however, including the
loss of tax shelter, absence of equity, and the inability to sublease.
E Exchange Programs
Exchange programs are integral to the acquisition of timeshare
interests. Exchange programs enable a participant to trade the use
of his timeshare interval for time at another resort. Frequently, a
developer subscribes to an independently operated exchange serv-
ice to provide buyers with an opportunity to exchange for time in
other timeshare projects.
Timeshare interests become more marketable if a purchaser can
avoid returning to the same resort year after year. This selling
feature was initially implemented through rental agencies or pools
which furnished the participants with a mechanism for periodi-
cally renting their space to third parties. The real solution, how-
ever, arrived with the creation of various types of exchange
programs or services.
In an exchange program, the developer pays a membership fee
to the service. Participating timeshare owners become individual
members by paying an annual fee to the exchange service. When
individual members wish to exchange their time periods, they ap-
ply to the exchange program, indicating the time period and loca-
tion desired as well as the time period and location offered in
exchange. Two distinct methods to effectuate such exchanges
have emerged: the "space bank" and the "interval selection."
In the "space bank" method, all individual members who desire
exchanges place their time periods in a "bank." A "depositor" can
withdraw a similar amount of time at another resort, simultaneous
with or subsequent to his deposit, as he desires. The drawback of
this system is obvious. Similar time periods at different locations
have varying degrees of appeal and value. Moreover, the more
desirable time periods will be withdrawn quickly, while the less
1984]
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desirable periods may stay on "deposit" indefinitely. Attempts
have been made to rectify this imbalance by restricting a mem-
ber's right to "trade up," or by imposing a charge on any member
withdrawing a more desirable time period than he is depositing
with the bank.
The "interval selection" method of exchanging timeshare peri-
ods closely resembles a barter system. Individual members submit
to an exchange service a list of time periods which they would ex-
change for their own time interval in order of preference. The serv-
ice then attempts to find a suitable match for that member. Three
or four exchanges may be involved to accomplish the desired goal.
The two leading timeshare exchange programs are "Interval In-
ternational" and "Resort Condominium International." The for-
mer uses the "interval selection" method, while the latter employs
the "space bank" method. While the opportunity to exchange one
timeshare interval for another has facilitated sales, exaggeration of
the realistic prospects for such an exchange have constituted the
largest element of marketing fraud in the timeshare field.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE MEASURES APPLICABLE TO
TIMESHARING VENTURES
A. Federal Securzi'es Regulation
Whether federal securities regulations apply to timeshare offer-
ings is uncertain. Notwithstanding the uncertainty, securities reg-
ulations apply if the venture is structured so that it may be
classified as an "investment contract."
Under the Securities Act of 1933,8 the definition of a security
includes an "investment contract."9 The starting point for defin-
ing an investment contract is the Supreme Court's opinion in SEC
. J. Howey Co. 10 In Howey, the Court defined an investment
contract as:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced
by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical
assets employed in the enterprise."
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
9. Id. § 77b(l).
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 298-99; see SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
[Vol. 10
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Subsequent decisions have modified the Howey test. In SEC v.
Glenn Turner Enterpri'ses, 12 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an investor may participate in an enterprise to a limited ex-
tent, as long as the efforts of others are "undeniably significant."' 3
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 14 the Supreme Court
further limited the Howey test by distinguishing the expectation of
profits from the personal use or consumption of the item
purchased. In Forman, the Court held that the sale of shares in a
nonprofit housing cooperative project did not involve an invest-
ment contract, stating: "What distinguishes a security transac-
tion-and what is absent here-is an investment where one parts
with his money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of
others, and not where he purchases a commodity for personal con-
sumption of living quarters for personal use."' 5 The test enunci-
ated in Forman, variously known as the "investment contract test,"
the "federal test," or the Howey-Forman test, is adhered to by a ma-
jority of states.'
6
Other jurisdictions have developed a different method of deter-
mining what constitutes an investment contract-the "risk capi-
tal" test. While simlar to the Howey-Forman test, the risk capital
test substitutes the expectation of "valuable benefits" for the
Howey-Forman requirement of "profits." As stated in State v. Hawaii
Market Center, 11 the risk capital test contains four elements to deter-
mine the existence of an investment contract:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) A portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the of-
feror's promises or representations which give rise to a rea-
sonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind,
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree
as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decision of the
enterprise. 18
12. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
13. 474 F.2d at 482.
14. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
15. Id at 858; see also Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976) (purchase of
shares in housing cooperative constituted real estate transaction not purchase of invest-
ment securities).
16. See Byrne, supra note 1, at 7-8.
17. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
18. Id. at 646, 485 P.2d at 109. One commentator states that the test was first sug-
19841
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The risk capital or Hawaii Market Center test, when used in con-
junction with the federal test, is perhaps the more important one
for timeshare developers. States that have adopted the Howey-For-
man test 19 and concurrently apply the Hawaii Market Center test
may consider the use of the timeshare unit as a "valuable benefit."
That benefit will accrue to the purchaser and may be one which
induced the purchase. 20  The structure of a particular timeshare
offering will determine how much influence a purchaser has in the
project's decision-making process. This factor will influence a risk
capital state's view of the amount of risk 2' to a purchaser's rights
in exercising any "actual and practical control. '22
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) position on
whether condominium or timeshare offerings constitute invest-
ment contract securities is difficult to discern.23 In 1967, the SEC
took its first enforcement action against a condominium offering.
24
gested in Coffey, The Economic Realities of a 'Security' Is There a More Meamngfl Formula?, 18
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967). See Byrne, supra note 1, at 6-7; see also Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (sale of
country club memberships constituted securities transaction).
19. States which have adopted the federal test include Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington. See Bloch, Regulation of Timesharing, TIMESHARING
II (Urb. Land Inst. 1982), reprinted in THE LEGAL ASPECTs OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHAR-
ING 289, 301 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
20. Timeshare advertising campaigns which stress the dollar savings of timeshare
units over traditional vacation costs or accomodations have led to findings of sufficient
benefits for the offerings to be considered securities in at least two states. See, e.g., In re
Vacation Internationale, Ltd., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
71,287 (March 15, 1976); 1975 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 186,citedin Byrne,supra note 1, at II-
12.
21. Risk factors examined may include whether the unit owners' association can pro-
tect purchasers' interests and the financial stability and history of the developer. See
Bloch, supra note 19, at 300-01. Higher risk has sometimes been found for offerings of
timeshare units in conjunction with a public business such as a hotel, where the invest-
ment is subiect to the hotel's successful operation. Byrne, supra note 1, at 10.
22. The amount of a purchaser's control will also depend upon the structure of the
particular timeshare project. The involvement of the developer is a key factor and may
depend to a large extent upon whether the interests sold are fee simple or licenses.
23. For a discussion of whether condominiums are securities, see Berman & Stone,
Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411
(1975); Clurman, Condominiums As Secunties: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); Dickey
& Thorpe, Federal Security Regulations of Condominium Ofengs, 19 N.Y.L.F. 473 (1974); El Is-
worth, supra note 1, at 694; Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing
Programs Which Feature A Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1969); Rosen-
baum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study In Governmental
Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. REV. 785 (1974); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A
Purchaser's Perspectine, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403 (1974); Comment, Condominium Regulations. Beyond
Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1975).
24. Hale Kaanapali Apartment Hotel Dev. Co., Registration Statement No. 2-25489
[Vol. I0
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The SEC held that the offer and sale of condominiums, in con-
junction with the offer to have the unit operate as part of a resort
hotel, was the offer and sale of a security within the meaning of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25 The SEC ordered the devel-
oper to refrain from any further sales pending registration and to
offer rescission to those who had already purchased. 26 Months
later, the SEC addressed the issue of whether rental pool arrange-
ments fell within the auspices of the Securities Act of 1933,27 indi-
cating that such arrangements satisfied the Howe), definition of
investment contract securities.
28
In 1973, the SEC issued Release Number 5347, which contained
an outline of the types of condominium offerings that would be
considered offers of securities. 29 Release Number 5347 remains the
most complete statement of the SEC position on condominium of-
ferings. The response of developers to the Release was swift. The
SEC immediately received many requests for no-action letters to
clarify questions raised or unanswered by the Release. One of the
earliest SEC responses was the Big Sky of Montana 30 no-action letter,
(effective date April 13, 1967), discussed in Gunnar, supra note 1, at 36 n.24; see Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1-10 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78j (1976)).
25. Hale Kaanapali Apartment Hotel Dev. Co., Registration Statement No. 2-25489
(April 13, 1967).
26. Id; see Ellsworth, supra note 1, at 695.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
28. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4877, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 77,462 (Aug. 8, 1967).
29. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973). The Release states:
In summary, the offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one of
the following will cause the offering to be viewed as an offering of securities in
the form of investment contracts:
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other similar service,
are offered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the purchaser
to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party
designated or arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the purchaser must
hold his unit available for rental for any part of the year, must use an exclu-
sive rental agent or is otherwise materially restricted in his occupancy or
rental of his unit.
Id
The Release was based in part on the report of the Real Estate Advisory Committee,
also known as the Dickey Committee, which was established in 1972. The stated purpose
of the Committee was to assist the SEC in reviewing its disclosure procedures and policy
objectives in the area of real estate security interests. See Real Estate Advisory Comm.
Report, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 79,265 (Oct. 12, 1972);
see also Ellsworth, supra note 1, at 695-96; Gunnar, supra note 1, at 36-37.
30. In re Big Sky of Montana, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 13, 1973). The com-
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involving a condominium offering with a rental pool arrangement.
Other no-action letters on timeshare offerings followed Release
Number 5347. For example, the SEC in its no-action letter to the
Innisfree Corporation 3' found no requirement for registration
where timeshare purchasers were merely offered assistance in rent-
ing their units. 32 The SEC has been consistent in not requiring
registration where the offering consists only of a membership, va-
cation license, or right-to-use interest.
33
In 1977, the SEC issued a letter regarding a timeshare offering
by Vacation Internationale, Ltd.34 (the Company). The Com-
pany's proposal offered the use of condominiums at several resort
locations, in segments of two weeks or more, through the purchase
of a vacation timeshare (VTS) interest with a term of forty years.
The Company would be responsible for management of the pro-
gram and facilities, while VTS owners would be free to sell or as-
sign their interests.
In its response to this proposal, the SEC stated that a VTS inter-
plete text of both the SEC no-action letter as well as the Big Sky request letter may be
found in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 199-203 (P.L.I. Real Es-
tate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
The no-action letter responded to the developer's proposal that a division of Big Sky
would act as a separate rental agent for each condominium owner, with net proceeds to be
remitted directly to each owner from the rental of his unit. The proposal did not require
that units be available for rental or at a designated time. The proposal did not permit
owners or their agents to rent their units independently. Condominium sales were to be
made by salesmen from another division of Big Sky, which was not connected with the
rental management division. The salesmen were to be instructed to respond to inquiries
by prospective buyers by telling them that rental agents were available in the area and
that a division of Big Sky was one such agent. Salesmen also were to make no representa-
tions regarding income or tax benefits, nor to mention actual or estimated rental changes.
Big Sky was to offer a right of rescission to any purchaser to whom such representations
were made. On the basis of these facts, the SEC stated it would not recommend action if
the interests were offered without registration under the Securities Act of 1933. Id.
31. See In re The Innisfree Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 179,398 (May 7, 1973).
32. Id
33. See, e.g., In re Bronze Tree Club, SEC No-Action Letter (May 12, 1976), reprited in
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 207 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And
Practice No. 220, 1982) (club memberships conferring right-to-use facilities; no right to
profits or proceeds; no interest in property or assets of Club; offered with emphasis on use
of facilities; no profit on resale); In re Caribbean Beach Club, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,819 (May 25, 1972) (vacation
license arrangement where developer may rent accomodation for own use if purchaser
does not use so long as purchaser receives no profits from hotel operation and purchaser
may not resell license at profit).
34. See I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, at § 17C.0ID(3) n.21.
[Vol. 10
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/4
TIMESHARING
est "may well be" an investment contract security. 35 It focused on
the forty year term, free alienation, and importance of promoter
management of the facilities and program. 36
The Company requested that the SEC reconsider its action. In
1979, the SEC responded to the Company's request by withdraw-
ing its 1977 finding. The 1979 letter provided that the VTS inter-
ests were not securities within the definition of the 1933 Act. 37 The
SEC based its opinion on the finding that VTS interests were
purchased to acquire vacation accommodations for personal use,
rather than investment purposes. Given the complexity of financ-
ing arrangements and the multitude of ownership plans in
timeshare projects, the SEC stated in its 1979 letter that it would
no longer respond to requests of developers for no-action letters. 38
The SEC ordered its staff not to respond to requests for no-ac-
tion letters or interpretive requests in the timesharing area. As its
rationale for this policy, the SEC stated that the financing ar-
rangements surrounding timesharing plans were too complex and
the legal arrangements too varied. 39
B. Miscellaneous Federal Statutes and Regulations40
1 FTC Regulation-Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over any
individual or corporation engaged in the sale of land in interstate
commerce. 4' In 1975, the FTC first exercised its jurisdiction in the
35. Id
36. See id
37. See In re Vacation Internationale, Ltd., SEC Action Letter, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,133 (Jan. 5, 1979).
38. See id
39. See id
40. A number of additional sources of federal laws and regulation governing
timesharing exist. Although beyond the scope of this article, these laws and regulations
include: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and Regulation Z,
12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1983); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(o
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) and Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-.1104 (1983); Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1976) and 16 C.F.R. §§ 700-703 (1983); Equal Accommodations Law (Title II of Civil
Rights Act of 1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976); Fair Housing Law (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); and Federal Flood
Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4027 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Schlaifer, Federal
Regulation of Timeshared Propery.• An Overview of Shared Agency Jurisdiction, reprinted in THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 329 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And
Practice No. 220, 1982).
41. In the Matter of Honzon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464 (1982), respondent contended that the
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timeshare area by commencing an investigation of promoters and
vendors of timesharing. This investigation sought to determine
whether any individuals or corporations were engaging in unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC
Act .
42
More recently, the FTC has asserted its consumer protection au-
thority in the land sales area. Having received numerous com-
plaints concerning members of the land sales industry, the FTC
has found many instances of section 5 violations. In response, the
FTC has issued complaints and obtained consent decrees. In an
effort to curb future violations of section 5, FTC officials fre-
quently appear at timesharing conferences, outlining potential
problem areas to prospective developers and their attorneys.
FTC investigations focus on two aspects of the sales process.
The first aspect covers misrepresentations made in connection with
the solicitation of customers interested in listening to a project's
sales presentation. The second aspect includes material misrepre-
sentations, misleading claims, and failure to disclose material facts
during sales presentations.
In re Market Development Corporation43 illustrates the types of mis-
representation that occur in the process of generating potential
timeshare customers. As part of its "lead generation" program,
the Market Development Corporation mailed letters informing a
recipient that he had won a free vacation. He subsequently dis-
covered that his vacation was not entirely "free," as an array of
nominal financial charges and high pressure sales pitches to invest
in a timeshare project were forced upon him.
The FTC held that Market Development Corporation had mis-
represented the availability and quality of the prizes it offered.
The time limits on acceptance of the prizes or goods, as well as the
prospective prize winner's obligation to listen to the sales pitch
before receiving the gift or prize, were also misrepresented in the
promotional materials. Furthermore, the materials represented
FTC lacked jurisdiction because Congress give the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) exclusive jurisdiction over the land sales industry when it enacted
the Interstate Lands Sales Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976). The FTC's opinion re-
jected respondent's contention, stating that neither the statute nor the legislative history
behind it purport to grant exclusive jurisdiction over fraudulent land sales to HUD. The
opinion concluded that the FTC and HUD serve complementary, rather than cotermi-
nous, regulatory roles with respect to interstate land sales practices. See Matter of Horizon
Corp., 97 F.T.C. at 860-64.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
43. 95 F.T.C. 100 (1980).
[Vol. 10
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/4
TIMESHARING
that the prize winners were specially selected, when in fact a mass
mailing had been used.
44
The most pervasive misrepresentations made ,to prospective pur-
chasers concern the potential profitability of the timeshare project.
This type of deception includes representations concerning the
buyer's ability to resell a unit, atypical past sales figures, and low
investment risk. Representations that a timeshare unit will limit
future vacation costs while providing a hedge against inflation
have also attracted investigation by the FTC. Equally common
are misleading claims regarding the nature and extent of present
and future development; the quality, location, and availability of
timeshare units; and the buyer's ability to exchange use rights in
other timeshare projects.
4 5
Clearly, any promotional material used for a timeshare project
must conform to the advertising standards established by the FTC
for land sale offerings. Failure to adhere to these standards can
result in protracted litigation as well as fines of up to $10,000 per
violation.
46
2. The Holder In Due Course Trade Regulation Rule
The Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses Regula-
tion,4 7 commonly known as the holder in due course rule, requires
that consumer credit contracts for the sale or lease of goods or serv-
ices contain the following notice:
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all
claims and defenses which the debtor could assert against the
seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or with the
proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not
exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
48
This rule has been applied to right-to-use timesharing, which the
FTC describes as a "novel form of consumer services. ' ' 4 9 The rule
has not yet been applied to fee timesharing. The FTC has stated,
however, that the goods and services portion of the timeshare
transaction might be compared against the real estate portion of
44. See id. at 104.
45. See F.T.C. v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C8111160 (W.D. Wash. 1981);
Matter of Horizon Corp, 97 F.T.C. 464, 808 (1981).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976). The FTC regards failure to comply with the rules
as an "unfair and deceptive practice." Id.
47. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1983).
48. Id. § 433.2(a).
49. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 45.
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the interest to require compliance with the rule. 50
3. Cooli ng- Of Period
The Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales Regulation
5'
provides that a purchaser must be given specific notice of his right
to cancel certain purchases during the three business days follow-
ing the date of the transaction. 52 The rule applies to a sale, lease,
or rental of consumer goods or services with a purchase price of
twenty-five dollars or more, in which the seller or his representa-
tive personally solicits the sale, and the agreement is entered into
at a place other than the seller's place of business.53 The penalty
for violation of the rule is a fine up to $10,000. 54 To date, the ap-
plicability of the cooling-off period rule to timesharing has not
been tested in the courts.
4. Interstate Land Sales Act
The Interstate Land Sales Act 55 (the Land Sales Act) requires
land developers to make full disclosure in connection with the sale
or lease of certain undeveloped, subdivided land. 56 A developer
may not sell or lease lots in a subdivision by use of the mail or any
means of interstate commerce. An exception is land for sale or
lease registered with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment and accompanied by a printed property report furnished
to the purchaser or lessee before the sales or lease agreement is
signed.
5
1
The Land Sales Act, which is administered by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Interstate Land
Sales Registration, defines a "lot" as "any portion, piece, division,
unit or undivided interest in land located in any state or foreign
country if the interest includes the rztht to the exclusive ,se of a speci
portion of the land "158 Section 1702(a)(2) exempts from the Land
Sales Act the sale or lease of any improved land on which there is a
"residential, commercial, condomium, or industrial building, or the
50. Id. n.158.
51. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1983).
52. Id
53. See id
54. 15 U.S.C. 45(1) (1976).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
56. Id at §§ 1704-1705 (1976).
57. Id § 1703 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
58. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.1 (1983) (emphasis added).
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sale or lease of land under a contract obligating the seller or lessor
to erect such a building thereon within a period of two years."1
59
Therefore, the vast majority of timeshare offerings appear to be
outside the ambit of the Land Sales Act. Nevertheless, counsel
should be aware of the Land Sales Act and its possible application,
particularly where construction of other facilities may not be com-
pleted within two years after the date of the offering. 6°
5. Mail Fraud
The federal Mail Fraud Statute6' prohibits the use of the postal
service to carry out fraudulent schemes. The statute does not con-
tain a litany of prohibited schemes and may apply irrespective of
whether the particular promotional material contravenes state
law. The statute imposes a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment
for up to five years for a violation. 62 Any fraudulent or misleading
material on timesharing sent through the postal service may be
covered by this statute.
C State Regulatog Measures
1. Types of Legislation
State regulation of timeshare offerings involves several types of
statutes. Therefore, a developer within a given jurisdiction may
find a project regulated by more than one agency or more than
one statute. State legislation covering timeshare offerings may
exist in a number of areas including: (1) timeshare laws or amend-
ments; 63 (2) subdivision laws;6 (3) condominium laws;65 (4) con-
sumer protection laws;6 or (5) "Blue Sky" laws.
67
To exacerbate the confusion, state legislation affecting timeshar-
ing is being enacted and amended at a rapid pace, while adminis-
trative regulations and opinions are changing this area of the law
on nearly a daily basis. In addition to statutes which may regulate
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
60. Ste id
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
62. Ste id
63. For example, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.
64. For example, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington.
65. For example, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, and Oregon.
66. For example, New Jersey and New York.
67. For example, Alaska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Oregon.
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the content and registration of an offering, a developer may also
have to comply with state statutes covering: (1) the licensing of
sales personnel as real estate brokers or sales people, or as securities
brokers or dealers; (2) the licensing and taxation of the developer's
company; (3) the taxation of the timeshare sales; (4) consumer
credit; and (5) usury.
2. State Blue Sky Laws
A timeshare offering may be covered by state Blue Sky Laws if
the offering of a timeshare interest is considered the sale of a "se-
curity." Under state Blue Sky Laws, securities are generally
viewed as agreements by which funds are invested in an enterprise
with the expectation that the investment will earn a profit. Agree-
ments that do not involve a profit-sharing venture or participation
will not fall within the coverage of state Blue Sky Laws.68 Never-
theless, each state's definition of "security" must be carefully con-
sidered. 69 Opinion letters and rulings of state securities
commissions shed considerable light on the states' regulation of
timeshare offerings. These rulings stem not only from the local
Blue Sky Laws, but also from the particular state's view of the
Hawaii Market Center or Howey-Forman definitions of an investment
contract.
Several states have ruled that vacation license offerings consti-
tute securities. 70 The focus has been on the risks involved in the
investment, particularly where the timeshare units are offered in
conjunction with a hotel operation. 7' An offering which highlights
the vacation cost savings may also be treated as a security.
72
An opinion letter of the Oklahoma Department of Securities
73
(the Department) ruled that a right-to-use timeshare offering con-
68. &e BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH), 4,1, ,
69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12520) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 751-A(9) (Supp. 1982); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-101(o) (1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 451.801(1) (1982); MINN. STAT. § 80A.14(18) (1982); Mo. REV. STAT.
§409.401(l) (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §4202(9) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.005(12) (1982); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(1) (1983).
70. For examples of states addressing the securities question, see BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 9 71,294 (Alaska); 71,287 (Michigan); $ 71,200 (Nevada); 9 39,721 (Oklahoma).
See Gunnar, supra note 1, at 40.
71. Alaska v. Vacation Internationale, Ltd., BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,294 (May
27, 1976).
72. In re Vacation Internationale, Ltd., BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,287 (March
15, 1976).
73. Opinion Letter, Okla. Dep't of Securities, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 146,642
(May 11, 1981); accord Opinion Letter, Okla. Dep't of Securities, BLUE SKY L. REP.
[Vol. I0
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/4
TIMESHARING
stituted a security under the Oklahoma Securities Act. In apply-
ing a "risk capital" test, the Department found a "common
enterprise" in advertised amenities such as golf, fishing, boating,
tennis, riding, and skiing. 74 The Oklahoma Act defined risk capi-
tal as an investment of money with the expectation of benefit.
75
Accordingly, the Department found that the offer of amenities
presented definite benefits to the investor. The Department found
other benefits in the long-term occupancy arrangement, which in-
cluded cost-containment features in the initial investment and in
maintenance fees restricted by contractual arrangement. 76 In ad-
dition, the Department noted that participants had no voice in the
managerial control of the lodge.
77
In contrast, a formal administrative ruling by the Georgia Com-
missioner of Securities (the Commissioner) declared that the sale of
fee simple timeshare units in a condominium, without a rental
pool or other profit-sharing arrangement, does not fall within the
purview of the Georgia Securities Act. 78 The ruling is based on
findings that: (1) any return from the purchase of a unit will not
result from the managerial efforts of the developer or other desig-
nated party, and (2) the purchase was not to be induced by
promises of promotional or sales efforts on the investor's behalf.
79
The Commissioner stated in part:
The manner of offering and economic inducements held out to
the prospective purchaser play an important role in determin-
ing whether a sale of condominium units involves a sale of se-
curities. In other words, the sale of condominiums, coupled
with a rental arrangement, will be deemed to be the sale of
securities if the condominiums are offered and sold through ad-
vertising, sales literature, promotional schemes or oral represen-
tations which emphasize the economic benefits to the purchaser
to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a
third party designated or arranged for by the promoter, in rent-
ing the units.80
(CCH) 146,643 (May 14, 1981); see also Letter of Corp. Comm'r, Oregon Dep't of Com-
merce, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 42,657 (Dec. 18, 1973).
74. Opinion Letter, Okla. Dep't of Securities, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 146,642
(May 11, 1981).
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Formal Administrative Declaratory Ruling, Comm'r of Securities, State of Geor-
gia, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 18,506 (Feb. 5, 1981).
79. See id.
80. Id (citing SEC Rel. No. 33-5347 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1049 (Jan. 4, 1973));
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An analysis of the securities regulation of timeshare offerings for
each state exceeds the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the
timeshgre developer's counsel must carefully analyze the status of
regulatory activity within a state, to ascertain whether a timeshare
offering must comply with that state's securities laws. If an offer-
ing is viewed as a security, the developer will be locked into a
scheme of regulation which prevents a buyer from modifying the
developer's offer.
IV. MODEL STATUTES AND SPECIFIC STATE TIMESHARING
MEASURES
Although the real estate timesharing industry is relatively new,
sixteen states have already enacted legislation or promulgated ad-
ministrative regulations specifically addressing one or more aspects
of timesharing. Comprehensive laws regulating the various forms
of timesharing have been adopted by Florida,81 Hawaii, 82 Vir-
ginia,83 Tennessee, 4 South Carolina, 85 and Nebraska. 86
In varying degrees these statutes have been patterned after two
model timesharing acts, the Model Real Estate Time Share Act8 7
(MRETSA), developed by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and the RTC/NARELLO model
Act88 (RTC/NARELLO), drafted jointly by the Real Estate
Timesharing Council of the American Land Development Associ-
ation (RTC) and the National Association of Real Estate License
Law Officials (NARELLO). Both model acts are designed to pro-
vide uniform timesharing legislation.
Nebraska adopted RTC/NARELLO in its entirety.8 9 The
timesharing laws of Florida, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Virginia are
based in part on RTC/NARELLO. MRETSA is the more de-
tailed and complex of the two acts and may provide the basis for
second-generation timesharing statutes, once developers, legisla-
see also Maryland Securities Act Release No. 19, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 30,561 (Oct.
18, 1974).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.01-.28 (West Supp. 1983).
82. HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 514E-1 to -15 (Supp. 1982).
83. VA. CODE §§ 55-360 to -400 (1981).
84. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-32-101 to -130 (Supp. 1982).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -230 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1982).
86. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741 (1981).
87. MRETSA §§ 1-101 to 5-110 (Supp. 1983).
88. RTC/NARELLO MODEL TIME-SHARE AcT (1979).
89. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741 (1981).
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tors, and regulators acquire experience with the timesharing
industry.
Uniform timesharing legislation is desirable for several reasons.
First, timesharing is necessarily a multi-state industry. Sales are
made in one jurisdiction for property located in another state or in
a foreign country. Uniform laws will simplify the evaluation of
different projects by prospective purchasers and lenders. Multi-
state exchange programs also make uniform timesharing laws
more desirable, since purchasers and users are typically from dif-
ferent states.
The divergent perspectives of the two model Acts result in part
from the differing viewpoints of their respective authors. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared MRETSA,
which is very detailed. MRETSA offers commentary analyzing
the purpose of each section. The commentary provides useful in-
formation for the attorney attempting to analyze a timeshare offer-
ing. In contrast, RTC/NARELLO was prepared by an
association that serves real estate developers. As such, it furnishes
developers with considerable leeway in fashioning their
documentation.
V. EMERGING PROBLEM AREAS IN TIMESHARING
There are unique economic and legal risks associated with real
property co-ownership, particularly with condominiums. In
timesharing ventures, these risks are magnified because the
number of participants may be far greater than in owner-occupied
developments. Moreover, timesharing ventures are typically lo-
cated in resort areas, far from the year-round home of the partici-
pants. Should legal complications arise, the minimal amount of a
participant's investment may preclude off-season travel to the site
or employment of local counsel in the jurisdiction where the resort
is located. Thus, the various elements of legal and financial expo-
sure for the timeshare participant must be anticipated and under-
stood before a decision to purchase is made.
A. Loss of Investment
Given the financial risks readily perceived in timesharing, a po-
tential buyer should not proceed unless he can afford the loss of his
entire investment. Apart from the risks normally associated with
real property ventures during the fragile pre-closing stage, the
timeshare participant is at the mercy of numerous third parties
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who may fail to fulfill their obligations. The threats from failure
of these obligations include: (1) participants who fail to make
prompt payment on their financial obligations; (2) management
which allows the premises to fall into disrepair; (3) casualty losses
which result in damage in excess of the insurance coverage then in
effect; (4) real estate taxes which are not paid; or (5) mortgages
which enter into default. Furthermore, the management fee may
be subject to future increase. In many projects, the developer, as
opposed to the timeshare owner, controls future fee increases by
the powers reserved to the promoter in the original documenta-
tion. Therefore, the annual fee charged by management may esca-
late to a point where the value of owning a timeshare all but
disappears.
B. Bankruptcy and Mortgage Foreclosure
The rapid growth of the timesharing industry has resulted, to
some extent, from a depressed condominium market. Developers
who have constructed large condominium projects may find them-
selves on the brink of insolvency. Many of these developers are
turning to timesharing as a method of achieving financial stabil-
ity,9° while investing a minimal amount of their own capital in a
project. As a result, early timeshare projects are prime candidates
for bankruptcy litigation and mortgage foreclosure.
Several commentators point out the significant distinction be-
tween ownership and non-ownership timesharing in the context of
bankruptcy or mortgage foreclosure. In ownership timesharing,
individual purchasers are insulated once they have closed title, be-
cause they have a property interest in the underlying fee. 91 This,
of course, assumes that all participants have purchased mortgage-
free property or have arranged for their own financing. In non-
ownership timesharing, however, the purchaser cannot protect his
investment from bankruptcy or foreclosure, since he remains per-
petually dependent upon the solvency of the developer, who holds
title.
Sombrero Reef Club 92 illustrates the attempted rejection of
timeshare contracts in bankruptcy. In Sombrero Reef Club, the prin-
cipal asset of the debtor was a resort-marina complex in southern
90. See Comment, Timesharing." A Unique Property Concept Creates the Need for Comprehen-
sive Legislation, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 629, 651 n.128 (1981).
91. Id.; see also Pollock, supra note 1, at 286.
92. In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
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Florida. Before the bankruptcy reorganization, the debtor mar-
keted a timeshare project and entered into many timeshare
purchase agreements. 9 3 The bankruptcy proceeding was com-
menced before the timeshare scheme was implemented. The
debtor requested permission to reject the contracts and sell the real
property.
94
The debtor had offered club memberships to purchasers who
paid an initial price ranging from $1,000 to $3,000 for the right to
use the property for one week per year over a thirty year period.
Some of the purchasers paid the purchase price in full, while
others were paying in installments. 95 The court found that the
timeshare contracts were all executory, including the ones for
which the purchase price had been paid in full, because substan-
tial obligations remained to be performed by parties on either side
of the transaction. 96 Finally, although a sale of the property would
be a breach of the contract and a violation of Florida's timeshare
statute, the court held that such breach did not constitute grounds
for denying rejection. Although the purchasers would have an ac-
tion for breach of contract, the contracts were rejected pursuant to
the federal bankruptcy law, which overrides any state statute that
has the effect of frustrating the operation of the bankruptcy law.97
C Federal Tax Liens
A timeshare purchaser also faces the possibility that a federal
tax lien98 may attach to a delinquent taxpayer's interest in a
timeshare condominium and related common areas. An interval
93. Id. at 614.
94. Id
95. Id at 614-15.
96. Id. at 616. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the rejection of an execu-
tory contract by a trustee or debtor-in-possession and sets forth the effect on and the rights
of parties upon rejection. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1976). The debtor remained obligated to
maintain the property and provide accommodations for many years to come, while the
timeshare purchasers had the obligation to pay annual dues. 18 Bankr. at 616. The court
stated that the contracts were not contracts for the sale of real property, since no convey-
ance of the title took place. It found that the timeshare interests were not unexpired
leases, since the contract suggested neither a lease nor a landlord-tenant relationship. The
court viewed the arrangement as an option to make reservations at a hotel at stated terms.
Id. at 617-19.
97. 18 Bankr. at 620.
98. See I.R.C. § 6321 (1976). Section 6321 provides that, "if any person liable to pay
any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien
in favor of the United States upon all property and right to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person." Id.
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estate owner is not affected by a federal tax lien upon another
owner's interest, because the interest is held in fee rather than in
tenancy in common. A timeshare estate which involves co-owner-
ship interests, such as a tenancy in common arrangement, is sub-
ject to the threat of a federal tax lien.99 Foreclosure of a federal
tax lien can force the sale of all co-ownership interests.
Several Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed the issue of
whether the government can force the sale of property held jointly
by the delinquent taxpayer. A majority of the circuits'0° hold that
section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the govern-
ment to sell any property in its entirety in which the delinquent
taxpayer has an interest and to compensate co-owners out of the
proceeds.
In 1979, the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) specifically
addressed the implications of a federal tax lien upon a timeshare
condominium.101 The Service held that since the interval
timesharing interest was recognized under state law as a property
right, a lien could only attach to the delinquent taxpayer's interest
and not to the other individual's interests in the unit or the com-
mon areas. 0 2 The Service stated that the "taxpayer's timesharing
condominium interest is separate and distinct from the other own-
ers' interests in that unit, and, therefore, is capable of being sold
without selling the unit itself.' 0 3 As one commentator notes,
"while the potential effect of foreclosure resulting from a federal
tax lien would be devastating, the likelihood of such a sale is small.
Suits to foreclose pursuant to a federal tax lien are extremely
rare."' 4 Nevertheless, the tax lien threat, as well as the spectre of
subsequent proceedings to enforce a judgment must be fully
considered.
D. Parlition
Partition provides a legal remedy by which people can free
99. Section 7403(a) authorizes the government to bring an action in federal district
court "to enforce the lien ... or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delin-
quent, or in which he has any right, title or interest, to the payment of such tax or liabil-
ity." Id § 7403(a) (Supp. V 1981)
100. See, e.g., United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964).
101. Rev. Rul. 79-55, 1979-1 C.B. 400.
102. Id
103. Id at 401.
104. Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 431.
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themselves from an undesirable common ownership arrange-
ment. 10 5 Courts will compel partition of commonly owned prop-
erty upon the petition of one co-tenant, regardless of the hardship
or injury to the other co-tenants. 10 6 "Where physical division of
the property is inequitable or impracticable, a court may partition
by ordering sale of the property and a pro rata distribution of the
proceeds to the co-owners."10 7 A co-tenant's claim for partition
may be defeated by proving that: (1) the creator of the co-tenancy
manifested an intent that there be no partition; (2) the co-tenants
by agreement have excluded partition for the continuance of their
lives or other reasonable time; or (3) that the plaintiff is in default
in his duties. 10 8
A covenant among co-owners to waive partition is enforceable
only where the agreement extends for a reasonable length of time,
or is sanctioned in condominium documents or by statute. If the
right to partition is restricted for an unreasonable amount of time,
the covenant will be unenforceable as a restraint on alienation. 10 9
Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the period set forth in
the Rule against Perpetuities, two lives in being plus twenty-one
years,110 is an appropriate measure of the maximum length for de-
termining what constitutes a reasonable period.
In the context of timesharing, partition poses a serious threat
and the consequences may be devastating. In order to preserve
either of the timeshare schemes based upon a tenancy in common,
a co-owner's right to compel judicial partition must be eliminated.
Under time span estate ownership, where all unit owners are ten-
ants in common of the real property, judicial partition can be
compelled against both the units and common elements."'I The
interval estate ownership arrangement is also subject to partition,
because the purchaser receives exclusive fee title for the period he
is entitled to possession with the remainder held in fee simple as a
tenant in common with all the other timeshare purchasers. 12 Pur-
chasers of non-ownership timeshares cannot avail themselves of
105. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 1, at § 609.
106. Id.
107. Comment, Fourth Dimenston, supra note 1, at 188.
108. 4A R. POWELL, supra note 1, at § 611.
109. See id at § 846; Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 433.
110. See MINN. STAT. § 500.13, subd. 2 (1982).
111. Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 432.
112. See Comment, Fourth Dimension, supra note 1, at 210.
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partition because they are not tenants in common with the other
purchasers in the project.
Tenancy in common timeshare ownership arrangements can be
preserved by eliminating the co-owners right to compel partition
in the project documentation. The declaration may contain either
an enforceable waiver of the common law right to compel parti-
tion or a covenant against partition, executed by each purchaser.
It is unclear whether such agreements are valid for a period ex-
tending longer than twenty-five to thirty years.' 3
Statutory prohibition of judicial partition provides a better solu-
tion to the problem. When states first began enacting condomin-
ium legislation, the danger of judicial partition in a common-
ownership context was addressed by enacting provisions barring
partition of the common elements. 1 4 Statutes barring judicial
partition provide that common elements shall remain undivided,
and that any action for partition or division of the ownership is
barred as long as the condominium regime is continued. 15 Stat-
utes barring partition, however, apply only to partition of the
common elements and do not address partition of units commonly
owned. This holds true even in states which permit common own-
ership of individual units.' 6
Both model timeshare acts carry the prohibition against parti-
tion one step further, prohibiting judicial partition of the
timeshare unit itself. 1 7 Florida, in its Real Estate Time Sharing
Act, contains a prohibition similar to those in the model acts. 18
113. See Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 434 n.54.
114. For a general discussion of the validity of covenants against partition, see I
ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 1, at § 8.01 n.1.
115. Id
116. For example, section 339-i of New York's Condominium Act states in part:
The common elements shall remain undivided and no right shall exist as to par-
tition or divide any thereof, except as otherwise provided in this article. Any
provision to the contrary shall be null and void. Nothing in this subdivision
shall be deemed to prevent ownership of a unit by the entireties, jointly or in
common.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-i(3) (McKinney 1982).
117. RTC/NARELLO § 2-107; MRETSA § 2-104 (Supp. 1983). The comment to
MRETSA section 2-104 points out that most, if not all, jurisdictions have statutes permit-
ting any tenant in common to compel, by judicial action, either a physical division of the
property or a sale and distribution of the proceeds. The purpose of section 2-104, the
comment notes, is to assure that the owners of timeshare estates are not entitled to the
rights conferred by those statutes. The comment also makes clear that section 2-104 does
not prohibit partition of a timeshare owned by two or more persons as tenants in common,
joint tenants or any other form of common ownership. ld. § 2-104 comment I.
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.22 (West Supp. 1983).
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Several state timesharing statutes deviate from a flat prohibition,
permitting the creator of the timeshare project to expressly pro-
scribe the right of partition.,"9
E. Tort Liability
Timeshare projects are generally founded on the basis of a con-
dominium scheme. The condominium is composed of common el-
ements and individual units. The unit owners constitute the
membership of the association. Therefore, the same aspects of tort
liability which apply to condominiums typically apply to time-
sharing projects.
Several different areas of potential tort liability exist in the con-
text of a timesharing scheme. One is the possibility of a unit own-
er 20 or a third party suffering injury in the common area and
bringing an action against the association. Most state condomin-
ium statutes provide that the association, whether or not it is in-
corporated, may sue and be sued. Thus, a third party injured by
the negligence of the association could sue that entity. Through
membership in the association, individual timeshare estate owners
are potentially liable to the injured party.
Incorporating the association offers one solution to tort ac-
tions.' 2 ' Incorporating the association brings "the established
body of corporate law to bear upon administrative operations of
the association and [limits] liability .. .,,'2 Georgia's condomin-
ium statute, for example, requires incorporation of the association
prior to recording the declaration. 23
119. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2197.04(14) (West Supp. 1982).
120. See White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971). While estab-
lished the principle that an unincorporated condominium association could be sued by a
unit owner. In granting the unit owner standing, the White court stated:
In view of. . .developments over the past decade we conclude that unincorpo-
rated associations are now entitled to general recognition as separate legal enti-
ties and that as a consequence a member of an unincorporated association may
maintain a tort action against his association.
Id at 828, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 261; accord Pratt v. Maryland Farms Condominium Phase I,
Inc., 42 Md. App. 632, 402 A.2d 105 (1979) (standards of liability applicable to possessor
of land vis-a-vis an invitee also applicable in the context of a condominium).
121. See Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas? - An Alternative, 50 N.C.L.
REV. 1 (1971); Note, Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common Elements-A Proposal, 23
VAND. L. REV. 321 (1970). Another solution is comprehensive liability insurance
coverage.
122. Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liabiity in the Development and Administration of Condo-
minium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 919 (1976); see also
Jackson, Why You Should Incorporate a Homeowners Association, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1975).
123. GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 85-1 6 32e (Supp. 1982).
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Since many condominium statutes are silent as to whether mem-
bers of an association can be held individually liable, conceivably
co-owners can be jointly and severally liable as well. MRETSA
specifically circumscribes the unit owner's individual liability.
124
A second area of potential tort liability is the liability of co-own-
ers as tenants in common for injury to a third party on the prem-
ises of an individual unit.1 25 Liability cannot arise, however,
under the interval estate concept, since each owner owns a distinct
period of time, exclusive of all rights and liabilities of persons who
have title to another period. 26 Determination of liability will
hinge upon whether the court views the timeshare estate as a true
tenancy in common or as a hybrid form of co-ownership, which
includes increased rights and liabilities.
F Joint Liabiity for Debt
The timeshare purchaser also faces liability for obligations in-
curred by the association such as contracts, property tax assess-
ments, and mechanics' liens. In jurisdictions that permit the
association to adopt formats such as a corporation, not for profit
corporation, or unincorporated association, the purchaser's legal
exposure may be clearly defined. On the other hand, where a par-
ticular condominium statute provides only for a "board of manag-
ers," each individual unit owner could be fully responsible for
contractual obligations of the unincorporated association.
Under some condominium statutes, a unit owner can free him-
self of the obligation by paying his aliquot share of the associa-
tion's obligations. MRETSA specifically resolves the question of
individual liability for contracts of the association in the first in-
stance, providing that "an action arising from a contract made by
or on behalf of the association may be aintained only against the
association."
27
The potential exposure relating to property tax assessments and
mechanics' liens raises issues distinct from contractual exposure.
Legal exposure to tax assessments and liens does not exist in inter-
val estate timeshare projects, since each timeshare interest is sepa-
rate. On the other hand, timeshare owners under a tenancy in
124. See MRETSA § 3-107(b)-(c) (Supp. 1983).
125. See Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 436.
126. Id at 437.
127. MRETSA § 3-107(c) (Supp. 1983).
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common approach are exposed to obligations of this character,
since they are co-owners.
Statutory provisions or project documentation is necessary to
eliminate this problem and to provide adequate protection for
timesharing purchasers. Counsel should press for legislation which
expressly states that liens can only arise against each timeshare in-
terest and that liens arising against two or more units may be dis-
charged by any individual unit owner by paying his pro rata share
of the debt.1 28 Legislation should also provide for separate taxa-
tion of each timeshare interest, thereby avoiding joint tax liability
which would otherwise arise among the owners as the holders of
the unit in common. 129 Interestingly, MRETSA provides that "a
judgment for money against the association is a lien against all of
the timeshares, but no other property of a timeshare owner is sub-
ject to the claims of creditors of the association."'
130
VI. CONCLUSION
Conveyancing of real property has traditionally been viewed as
an exacting task. The role of purchaser's counsel becomes all the
more taxing when condominium documents are involved, and
reaches the height of complexity when timesharing is involved. In
such an undertaking, a thorough grounding in both litigation and
real estate will prove invaluable, although on occasion it may
prove a poor substitute for omniscience. A timesharing project
will never be free of legal and economic risks. The attorney's role
is to sift through the offering to determine the risks and their man-
ageability. In the last analysis, one should always advise a client
that in matters of timesharing, "Murphy's Law" is paramount. If
the client still insists upon making the purchase, advise him to
128. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-19 (1953). Section 57-8-19 insulates each
timeshare owner from joint liability for debts incurred by a co-owner in the same unit. Id
But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:3 (1983) (defines a "unit" in terms of physical
space). Although the New Hampshire Condominium Act provides elsewhere that liens
shall only be created against each unit and that each unit shall be separately taxed, each
timeshare purchaser holding a joint interest in one unit will be fully liable for the total
amount of debts or assessed taxes which are the subject of liens on the unit. Comment,
Fourth Dimension, supra note 1, at 228-30.
129. See UTAH CODE ANN. §57-8-27(1) (Supp. 1981). MRETSA makes each
timeshare other than a timeshare license a separate estate or interest for all purposes be-
sides assessment and taxation. Whether timeshare estates are separate estates for purposes
of assessment and taxation, and whether a distinction is made in this regard between fee
simple timeshare estates and timeshare estates for years, depends on a particular state's
preference. See MRETSA § 1-103 (Supp. 1983).
130. MRETSA § 3-107(d) (Supp. 1983).
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walk with his back against the wall, carry a Bible, and, if all else
fails, punt.
APPENDIX
NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR
TIMESHARING OFFERING PLANS
I. Introduction:
A. Nature of Offering
B. Location of Development
C. Description of Timeshare Interests Being Offered
1) Explanation of Timesharing Concept
2) Maximum Number of Intervals to be
Offered/Created
D. Special Risk Factors
1) No Resale Market
2) Risk of Partition
3) Risk of Federal or State Tax Lien
4) Possible Superiority of Trustee in Bankruptcy
5) Failure of Prior Occupant to Vacate
6) Reliance upon Sponsor/Managing Agent
7) Difficulty in Voting or Lack of Voting Rights
8) Possible Unavailability of Facilities in Future
(Right-to-Use)
9) Intervening Liens
10) Excessive Wear and Tear on Furniture and
Furnishings
11 ) Special Assessments
12) Exchange Club Privileges Contingent
13) Additional Factors Associated with Particular
Development
E. Description of Property and Improvements
1) Acreage of Zoning (Fees Only)
2) Existing Improvements
a) Original Date of Construction
b) History of Use, e.g., Hotel, Motel, Etc.
c) History of Casualty Losses
d) Existing Building Code Violations and Date
of Last Inspection
[Vol. I0
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e) Statement Regarding Manner of Depreciation
Used and Whether Depreciation is Available
f) Summary of Profit and Loss for Past 5 Years
if Previously Operated as a Hotel or Motel
3) Recreational Facilities and Common Areas
a) Construction Schedule if Applicable
4) If a Condominium or HOA Describe and Cross-
Reference to:
a) Legal Description of Unit and Association or
Regime
b) Legal Description of Interval
c) Allocation of Percentages of Common Interests
d) Construction Data for Units and Common
Areas Including Projected Schedules for
Completion of Units and Facilities
e) Easements and Covenants
5) Description of Status of Title Purchaser will
Receive Including Discussion of Existing or
Possible Liens, Encumbrances, or Judgments
Which may Affect title
F. Description of Surrounding Areas and Facilities
1) Proximity to Airports, Bus, and Train
Terminals, Available Methods of Transportation
to Development and Estimated Cost
2) Proximity to Major Highways and Estimated
Mileage and Driving Time to Nearby Cities
3) Proximity to Nearby Shopping Facilities,
Especially Foodstores; Availability of
Transportation and Estimated Cost to and From
such Facilities
4) Description of Police, Ambulance, and Fire
Services
5) Proximity to Medical and Religious Facilities
G. Sponsor's Future Development
II. Projected First Year Operating Budget
A. Statement of Assumptions
B. Itemized Budget with Footnotes
C. Letter of Adequacy
D. Explanation of Reserve Escrow Accounts
1) Cross-Reference to Exhibit -, (Itemized
Inventory of Unit Furnishings Including
Estimates of Useful Life of Major Items) and
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Explain how Annual Contribution to Escrow
Fund Established
E. Method by Which Operating Expenses Will be
Allocated to Interval Owners
1) Statement of Sponsor's Obligation to Pay All
Charges, Fees, Dues, and Assessments Allocable
to Unsold Intervals
2) Description of Security to Assure Sponsor's
Payment of Charges Due from Unsold Intervals
F. Description of all Charges, Dues, Fees, and
Assessments Which may be Imposed upon Purchasers'
Stating Manner, Frequency, and Purpose
G. Description of any Service Provided by Sponsor
Without Charge Which may in the Future Become a
Common Expense of all Owners
III. Sale of Intervals
A. Interval Schedule
B. Price Schedule
1) Must Specifically Define all Seasons, i.e., High,
Swing, Etc.
C. Describe Terms of Purchase Agreements (Cross
Reference to Exhibit)
1) Describe all Fees, Commissions, Charges, Dues,
Deposits, Assessments, or other Payments Which
May Become Due for any Reason Whatsoever at
the Time of Signing Purchase Agreement and/or
Closing
D. Payments Held as Trust Funds
1) Sponsor's Undertaking to Comply with
Applicable State Law (in New York, Section
352-e (20b) and 352-h of the General Business
Law)
2) Name and Address of Bank Where Trust
Account will be Maintained
3) Funds to be Released only Upon Signature of
Attorney
4) Funds to be Used Only in Connection with
Consummation of Transaction
5) How and When will Purchaser's Interest be
Conveyed (Cross-Reference to all Documents to
be Used, Exhibits to ) Discuss
and Explain Principal Terms of all Documents
[Vol. 10
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6) Closing Costs
E. Describe Condition of Title to be Delivered at Time
of Signing of Contract or Closing
1) Describe all Documents of Record Filed or to be
Filed in Connection with Creation of the
Timeshare Regime, e.g., Declaration of
Condominium, Restrictive Covenants,
Easements, Etc., Cross Reference to Copies of all
Documents in Part II
2) Describe all Liens, Encumbrances or Defects in
Title Which Affect the Property or the
Timeshare Units
3) Describe any Pending or Reasonably
Anticipated Lawsuit Which if Reduced to
Judgments Might Affect the Property or the
Timeshare Units
4) Describe all Mortgages Affecting the Property of
the Timeshare Units, State Whether Non-
Disturbance Clause Exists, Whether Mortgage is
Self-Amortizing or a Balloon, State Who has
Obligation to Pay Balloon Consequences if not
Paid or Refinanced
5) Describe Restrictions on Transfers of Intervals, if
any
F. Describe Operation of Exchange Program
1) Who Operates it
2) Relationship to Sponsor
3) General Description of Procedure to Join and
Use
4) Current Policies and Costs (Approximate Range)
5) Who may Participate
IV. Management and Operation of Development
A. Identity of Managing Agent and Affiliation with
Sponsor if any
1) State Background and Experience of Managing
Agent
2) Describe Duties of Managing Agent
3) Describe Terms of Management Agreement
Including Duration, Renewals, Fees, Etc.
B. Owners' Association
1) Owners' Association
2) Board of Managers/Directors
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a) Control by Sponsor
b) Powers and Responsibilities
C. Describe all Insurance Coverage on Property &
Timeshare Units and Liability Coverage for Owners'
Association and Individual Owners
D. Contracts Entered into by Sponsor Which will be
Binding on Owners
E. Method by Which Timeshare Regime may be
Terminated
V. Sponsor's Obligations
A. To Complete all Construction in Accordance with
Specifications and Construction Schedules
B. To Deliver Unencumbered Intervals to Purchasers
C. To Pay all Charges Attributable to Unsold Intervals
D. To Record all Documents Necessary to Create the
Timeshare Regime Prior to First Sale and to Deliver
Copies to the Owners' Association
E. To Obtain Non-Disturbance Clauses from all
Mortgagees Having an Interest in the Property or
Otherwise Guaranteeing Rights of Interval Owners
F. To Pay all Construction and Development Costs and
to Discharge Promptly by Bond or Otherwise any
Mechanic's Lien Filed Against the Property or any
Timeshare Unit
G. To Establish and Maintain Replacements Reserve
Escrow Accounts Sufficient to Replace and/or Repair
Units Furniture and Furnishings on a Regular Basis
H. To Provide a Fund by Escrow or Otherwise from
Which Right-to-Use Purchasers may Obtain a Pro
Rata Refund in the Event the ITnerval and/or
Facilities are Unavailable for use
I. A Representation by Sponsor that he will not Sell,
Convey, Alienate, Encumber, or Otherwise Transfer
any Interest in or to the Property, Facilities or any
Timeshare Unit to a Third Party unless such Third
Party Shall First Agree in Writing that he will Fully
and Faithfully Honor and Perform all of the Duties,
Obligations and Commitments of the Sponsor to the
Owners' Association and the Individual Interval
Purchasers
J. Discussion of Terms of Sponsor Financing if Being
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Offered (Cross-Reference to Copies of Related
Documents Exhibit - in Part II)
VI. Purchaser Obligations
A. Owner Obligation to Pay Annual Maintenance
Charges
B. Explain Under what Circumstances an Owner may
be Subject to Additional Charges or Assessments and
by Whom Same may be Imposed
C. Explanation of Which Charges, if Unpaid, may
Become a Lien Against a Purchaser's Interest
1) Describe How and Whwn such Liens may be
Foreclosed and by Whom (Cross-Reference to
Appropriate Sections of Documents in Part II)
D. Describe Remedies Available to Interval Owners if
Preceding Occupant Fails to Vacate Unit When
Required (Cross-Reference to Appropriate Section in
Documents in Part II)
E. Summary of By-Laws, House Rrules Etc., Which will
be Binding on Interval Owners (Cross Reference to
Part II)
1) Describe Procedure by Which such Rules Etc.,
may be Amended
VII. General
A. Identity of Sponsor, its Principals, Officers, and
Directors
1) Principal Place of Business
2) Experience in the Development and Operation
of Timeshare Resorts
3) Whether Timeshare Projects Previously
Associated with the Project are Currently
Operating, Sales Achievement, Etc.
B. Identity of Selling Agent, Architects, Engineers, and
Attorneys
C. Litigation History (Including Administrative
Proceedings)
D. Sponsor's Profit
E. Non-Discrimination Policy
F. Plan as Fair Summary
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Exhibits to be Included in Plan
(Part II)
A. Map of Surrounding Areas and Facilities
B. Site Plan with Unit Designations
C. Typical Floor Plans
D. Three Dimensional View of Typical Unit
(Condominiums Only)
E. Purchase Agreement
F. Financing Documents, if any, e.g., UCC-1, Note, PM
Mortgage, Installment Sales Contract, Etc.
G. Declarations, Easements, Covenants, Master Deed,
Etc.
H. By-Laws, Rules and Regulations
I. Unit Deed
J. Management Agreement
K. Certified Financial Statements
L. Opnions of Counsel
M. Other Documents Which may be Required
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